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A LEGAL APPRAISAL OF MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ
James P. Terry
The determination by the George W. Bush administration to enter Iraq andremove the regime of Saddam Hussein from power in early 2003 followed
twelve years of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Prior to the decision by the United States and its coalition partners to intervene
in Iraq with military force, Saddam Hussein had done everything possible to
avoid complying with the will of the international community. Of the
twenty-six demands made by the Security Council since 1990, Iraq had com-
plied with only three. Equally significant, the regime’s repression of the Iraqi
people continued.
The 2 October 2002 joint resolution of Congress authorizing the use of all
means, including force, to bring Iraq into compliance was merely one of a series
of actions by Congress to address Baghdad’s noncompliance with its interna-
tional obligations.1 In 1998, for example, Congress
passed a similar resolution declaring that Iraq’s con-
tinuing weapons of mass destruction programs
threatened vital U.S. interests as well as international
peace and security; declaring Iraq to be “in material
breach of its international obligations”; and urging
President Clinton “to take all appropriate action, in
accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of
the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with
its international obligations.”2
These congressional and UN Security Council res-
olutions were not the only outcries for change. In the
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Iraq Liberation Act, passed in 1998, lawmakers expressed the sense of Congress
that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the
Iraqi regime from power and to promote the emergence of a democratic govern-
ment to replace that regime.3 The reasons for this strong congressional reaction to
the Hussein regime rested not solely on Iraqi defiance of United Nations resolu-
tions but also on Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi people, his support for
international terrorism, and his refusal to account for Gulf War prisoners or to
return stolen property to Kuwait following the 1990–91 conflict, as well as the
Baathist regime’s efforts to circumvent economic sanctions.
FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT
This article examines these Iraqi violations in the context of contemporary in-
ternational law standards justifying intervention. More significantly, it examines
the right of states to enforce mandates issued by the Security Council and to re-
dress violations of its edicts when the Council, as a body, refuses to do so. This is
precisely what occurred when the Baathist regime refused to comply fully with
the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.4 Finally, the article
examines the independent authority available to states, such as the right to inter-
vene to address a threat to international peace and security under Article 51 of
the Charter and to invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, when the
Security Council cannot or will not act although its edicts have been clearly
violated.
The intervention by the United States and its coalition partners in Iraq in
March 2003 must be viewed as a significant historical precedent in the relation-
ship of a major power to the Security Council. Previously, in 1998 in Kosovo, the
United States and a coalition largely made up of NATO partners had intervened
to rescue and protect the threatened Albanian population from Serb aggression
without specific Security Council approval. While the military action in Kosovo
could arguably be justified as a humanitarian intervention, the coalition entry
into Iraq in 2003 was justified on the basis of repeated violations of UN Security
Council resolutions under Chapter VII (authorizing all necessary means) and of
the threat to international peace and security in the region and the world com-
munity posed by the Saddam Hussein regime as a result thereof.5 As President
Bush stated to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002:
Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime’s forces
were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had
Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the
peace and stability of the world. Yet the aggression was stopped—by the might of co-
alition forces and the will of the United Nations.
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To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq’s dictator accepted a series of commit-
ments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is comply-
ing with every one of those obligations.
He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his
pledges. By breaking every pledge—by his deceptions, and by his cruelties—Saddam
Hussein has made the case against himself. . . .
The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations,
and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of
defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defin-
ing moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast
aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its found-
ing, or will it be irrelevant?6
Thus, the intervention in Iraq must be viewed through a different lens than
either our intervention in Afghanistan, where we responded to a direct attack on
America, or our intervention in Kosovo, where the coalition responded to a
solely humanitarian crisis.7 In Iraq, the coalition led by the United States and the
United Kingdom was responding to an attack on the very effectiveness of the
United Nations security system, by seeking redress for repeated violations of Se-
curity Council resolutions. If not addressed directly, these violations would have
done irreparable harm to the minimum world order system represented by Arti-
cle 2(4) and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to the peace and security
of the region, and to the well-being of the Iraqi people.8
ANALYSIS OF IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL
MANDATES
Prior to intervention on 19 March 2003 and the inception of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, the regime of Saddam Hussein had repeatedly violated sixteen UN Se-
curity Council resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to place sharp controls on the
regime’s activities and to ensure that Iraq did not pose a threat to international
peace and security.9 These violations spanned a period of more than twelve years
and were first addressed in Security Council resolutions arising from the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
In UNSCR 678, passed in the fall of 1990, UN member states were authorized
“to use all necessary means” to redress the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.10 Resolution
686 (1991) placed requirements on Iraq to return all prisoners, restore all prop-
erty seized, and accept liability for all damages arising from its illegal invasion of
Kuwait.11 The most significant of the early resolutions addressing Iraqi viola-
tions, UNSCR 687 (the cease-fire resolution of 3 April 1991), required that Iraq
“unconditionally accept” the destruction, removal, or neutralization “under
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international supervision” of all “chemical and biological weapons and all
stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components”; it further re-
quired that Iraq declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs, not
“use, develop, construct or acquire” any weapon of mass destruction, and reaf-
firm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.12 This instru-
ment was followed by UNSCR 688 (1991), which “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s
repression of its civilian population, “the consequences of which threaten inter-
national peace and security,” and demanded that this repression cease.13
In UNSCR 707 (1991), the Security Council “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s “serious
violation” of UNSCR 687 and further “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s noncompliance
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its obligations under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This resolution required that Iraq halt nu-
clear activities of all kinds, and it mandated that Baghdad make a full and com-
plete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile
programs.14 When Iraq did not comply, the Council passed UNSCR 715 (1991)
mandating that Iraq cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.15
In 1994, Saddam Hussein’s regime began military deployments designed to
threaten Kuwait once again. The Security Council passed UNSCR 949 (1994)
condemning these military deployments and directing Iraq not to utilize its
military or other forces in a hostile manner so as to threaten its neighbors or UN
operations in Iraq.16
Within two years, it was apparent that Saddam Hussein was again acquiring
unauthorized weapons components. In response, the Security Council passed
UNSCRs 1051 and 1060 (1996). In UNSCR 1051, the Council demanded that
Iraq report to the UN and IAEA shipments of dual-use items related to weapons
of mass destruction.17 It also required Iraq to cooperate fully with UN and IAEA
inspectors and to allow them immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access.
This was followed by UNSCR 1060, which “deplored” Iraq’s refusal to allow access
to UN inspectors and Iraq’s “clear violations” of previous UN resolutions.18
In 1997, with access for inspectors still effectively denied, the Security Coun-
cil passed UNSCR 1115, which “condemn[ed] repeated refusal of Iraqi officials
to allow access” to UN officials. The Council charged that these actions consti-
tuted a “clear and flagrant violation” of UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, and 1060.19 In
UNSCR 1134 (1997) the Security Council repeated its demands contained in
UNSCR 1115.20 When Iraqi actions threatened the safety of UN personnel in late
1997, the Council “condemn[ed] the continued violations by Iraq” of previous
UN resolutions, including its “implicit threat to the safety of aircraft operated by
UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.”21
The Iraqi lack of cooperation with the inspection regime continued in 1998,
and in March the Security Council passed UNSCR 1154, which stated that any
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violation would have the “severest consequences for Iraq.”22 On 5 August 1998,
the Baathist regime suspended all cooperation with UN and IAEA inspectors.
This led to Security Council condemnation in UNSCR 1194 (1998), and the
claim that Iraqi actions constituted “a totally unacceptable contravention” of its
obligations under UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, and 1060.23 On 31 October 1998 the
Iraqis made their August suspension permanent and ceased cooperation with
UN inspectors. The Council, in UNSCR 1205, “condemn[ed]” this decision and
described it as a “flagrant violation” of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.24
In 1999, frustrated by the continued lack of Iraqi cooperation, the Security
Council passed UNSCR 1284, which created the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the previous
weapons inspection team, the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM), which had been in existence since 1991. In creating this new entity,
the Council stated (in Resolution 1284) that Iraq must allow UNMOVIC “im-
mediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to Iraqi officials and facilities.25
This concern with Iraqi weapons was reemphasized in UNSCR 1382 (2001),
where the Council reaffirmed the obligation of all states to prevent the sale or
supply to Iraq of weapons or any other military equipment.26
Finally, in UNSCR 1441 (2002) under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Secu-
rity Council stated that it was “determined to secure full compliance with its de-
cisions.”27 The Council “decide[d] that Iraq ha[d] been and remain[ed] in
material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions . . ., [d]ecide[d] . . .
to afford Iraq . . . a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obliga-
tions,” and “decide[d] that false statements or omissions in the declarations sub-
mitted . . . shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will
be reported to the Council for assessment.”28
Equally disturbing, during the period represented by the preceding resolu-
tions Saddam Hussein had repeatedly circumvented UN economic sanctions.
Further, he refused to allow weapons inspectors to oversee the demolition of his
weapons of mass destruction; failed to destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a
range greater than 150 kilometers; failed to stop support for terrorism or pre-
vent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; failed to help account
for missing Kuwaitis; refused to return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear finan-
cial responsibility for damage from the first Gulf War; and continued his repres-
sion of the Iraqi people.29
In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the Security Council also issued at
least thirty statements from its president regarding Saddam Hussein’s continued
violations of these resolutions.30 Following the thirty days allowed in Resolution
1441 for an Iraqi response to the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1441, Secre-
tary of State Colin Powell addressed the unresponsiveness of the Iraqi regime in
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detailed remarks to the Security Council on 7 March 2003, in which he docu-
mented Baghdad’s failure to meet the requirements of UNSCR 1441:
Iraq’s current behavior, like the behavior chronicled in Dr. Blix’s document, reveals
its strategic decision to continue to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the trail,
to make it more difficult, to hope that the will of the international community will be
fractured, that we will go off in different directions, that we will get bored with the
task, that we will remove the pressure, we will remove the force. And we know what
has happened when that has been done in the past. We know that the Iraqis are still
not volunteering information and, when they do, what they are giving is often partial
and misleading. We know that when confronted with facts, the Iraqis are still chang-
ing their story to explain those facts—but not enough to give us the truth. So has the
strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the
leadership in Baghdad? My judgment, I think our judgment, has to be clearly not.31
CONFRONTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL INACTION
When President Bush secured broad bipartisan support for the Joint Resolution
to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq on 2 October
2002, few imagined that the Security Council would not ultimately follow suit.32
After all, American leaders had obtained unanimous support in the Council for
UNSCR 1441, which all but delivered an ultimatum. Secretary Powell clearly de-
fined the burden of Council membership in his 7 March 2003 address:
Security Council membership carries heavy responsibilities. We must not walk away.
We must not find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed
and with Iraq once again marching down the merry path to weapons of mass de-
struction, threatening the region, threatening the world.
If we fail to meet our responsibilities, the credibility of this Council and its ability to
deal with all the critical challenges we face will suffer. As we sit here, let us not forget
the horror still going on in Iraq, with a spare moment to remember the suffering
Iraqi people whose treasure is being spent on these kinds of programs and not for
their own benefit; people who are being beaten, brutalized and robbed by Saddam
Hussein and his regime.
Colleagues, now is the time for the Council to send a clear message to Saddam that
we have not been taken in by his transparent tactics. Nobody wants war, but it is
clear that the limited progress we have seen, the slight substantive changes we have
seen, come from the presence of a large military force—nations who are willing to
put their young men and women in harm’s way in order to rid the world of these
dangerous weapons.
It doesn’t come simply from resolutions. It doesn’t come simply from inspectors. It
comes from the will of this Council, the unified will of this Council and the willingness
to use force, if it comes to that, to make sure that we achieve the disarmament of Iraq.
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Now is the time for the Council to tell Saddam Hussein that the clock has not been
stopped by his stratagems and his machinations. We believe that the resolution that
has been put forward for action by this Council is appropriate and, in the very near
future, we should bring it before this Council for a vote.33
The draft Security Council resolution Secretary Powell spoke of in his address
to the Council was opposed by Russia and France and thus never was formally
proposed for a vote within that body. The provisional draft of 7 March 2003,
brought under Chapter VII of the Charter, stated that the Council was deter-
mined to secure full compliance with its decisions and to restore international
peace and security in the area.34 It further stated
that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441
(2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has dem-
onstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with
its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) and previous relevant res-
olutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the AEIA [sic] of all weapons,
weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by resolution 687
(1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior
destruction of such items.35
When the Council did not agree to the proposed resolution, President Bush,
with the support of the United Kingdom, Spain, and more than forty other na-
tions, directed U.S. forces, in a coalition with the British, to enter Iraq on 19
March and remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.36 This decision came only af-
ter President Bush had determined that reliance by the United States on further
diplomatic or other peaceful means alone would not lead to enforcement of all
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and his
further determination that the Security Council, despite the Iraqi noncompli-
ance with UNSCR 1441, would not act.
Not surprisingly, on 22 May 2003, after the United States and Great Britain
had freed the region from the threat posed by the Baathist regime in Iraq and the
Iraqi people from the repression of Saddam Hussein, the Security Council
passed UNSCR 1483 by a vote of 14–0.37 This resolution recognized the United
States and the United Kingdom as the “authority” in Iraq pending establishment
of an independent democratic Iraqi government, and it affirmed “the need for
accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi re-
gime.” Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (and expressly recognizing
that the situation in Iraq “continues to constitute a threat to international peace
and security”), the Security Council further:
4. Call[ed] upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations
and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people
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through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working
toward the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of con-
ditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future.38
ANALYSIS OF THE LAWFULNESS OF THE USE OF FORCE IN IRAQ
In light of the failure of the Council to act to enforce UNSCR 1441 and all pre-
ceding relevant resolutions with respect to Iraq, it is important to consider
whether this inaction in the face of prior commitment authorizes any individual
state or coalition of member states to enforce demands upon a member state by
the Security Council. In the case of the United States, not only had President
Bush persuasively argued his case before the United Nations on 12 February
2003, but Congress had likewise endorsed the use of force by the president in its
2 October 2002 joint resolution.39 In that resolution, Congress identified both
the threat to the United States and to international peace and security, and the
need for humanitarian intervention:
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United
States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in
material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other
things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weap-
ons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and
harboring terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council
by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threat-
ening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate,
or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American
serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait.40
While the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the UN
system is lodged with the fifteen-member Security Council, its effectiveness as
an instrument of collective action has often been neutralized when the support
of all permanent members, required by Article 27(3), for such a decision is not
forthcoming.41 This was in March 1999, when the Chinese and Russian delegates
refused to support a draft Security Council resolution authorizing NATO-led
forces to intervene in the Kosovo crisis, despite the support of twelve of the fifteen
Council members. The situation arose again in March 2003, when the Russian and
French delegates refused to support the coalition-led intervention in Iraq.
It was precisely this concern that led legal experts to debate, long prior to the
Kosovo and Iraq crises, criteria that would respond to Council inaction in the
face of obvious violations of Charter principles. In 1974, Professor Richard
Lillich of the University of Virginia, distressed at the inability of the Security
Council to function in matters requiring the unanimous approval of the
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permanent members for Chapter VII (“all necessary means”) operations, ar-
gued that the most important task confronting international lawyers was to clar-
ify the various criteria by which the legitimacy of a state’s use of force for ends
supportive of Charter principles could be judged.42
In Iraq, as in Kosovo, the coalition’s use of military force to prevent the con-
tinuation of the myriad abuses outlined in UNSCR 1441 was consistent with
state practice that has established the lawfulness of intervention when carefully
circumscribed by the parameters outlined in Article 2(4). Articles 39 to 51 of the
Charter establish a framework for collective security based on the use of military
force and provide the Security Council with authority for enforcement.43 De-
spite these powers, the reluctance of certain Council members in the case of
Kosovo in 1998 and Iraq in 2003 left the organization on the sidelines at a time
when, according to the Charter, its possibilities should have been used to the
maximum. Evidence of partisanship and division among Council members, and
especially among the Permanent Five, may explain the sidetracking of the Secu-
rity Council. Nevertheless, we should take such matters with the utmost serious-
ness and ask ourselves what can be done to restore the Council to the position of
influence it was given in the Charter.
In fact, Chapter VII makes extensive provision for collective action by the or-
ganization “to maintain or restore international peace and security” when a
threat to the peace or an act of aggression has occurred.44 Under Chapter VII it is
the Council that must decide whether in any particular instance a threat to the
peace exists; whether aggression has been committed and, if so, by whom; and fi-
nally, what, if any, collective steps by the world organization would best remedy
the situation. With the exception of UN-sanctioned action in the defense of Ku-
wait in 1990, however, it has never been possible to invoke these collective en-
forcement provisions. Even in Korea, the potential veto of the Soviet
ambassador obliged the organization to turn to the General Assembly for the
necessary authority under Articles 11, 14, 18, and 24 of the Charter.45
The scarcity of actions brought under the collective-action provisions of
Chapter VII does not in any way suggest a more peaceful world than the Char-
ter’s framers envisioned. By 1970, some twenty-five years after the United Na-
tions came into existence, Professor Thomas Franck had already recorded more
than one hundred outbreaks of hostility between states.46 The total is now easily
double that number. In response, and as the Chapter VII collective-action provi-
sions have been marked by their lack of visibility, increasing use has been made
by states, including the United States, of Articles 51, 52, and 53, which set out the
rights of states themselves, under certain exceptional circumstances, to resort to
the use of force outside the UN’s collective-action framework. In fact, it is fair to
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say that today the exceptions have overwhelmed the rule and transformed the
system.
This was certainly the case in Iraq in 2003. The Security Council had repeat-
edly condemned Iraqi actions that had resulted in violations of international
peace and security.47 It is important to note that after the United States and Great
Britain successfully intervened in March 2003—both to eliminate the threat to
international peace described in numerous Security Council resolutions and to
eliminate the violations of international human rights law described in UNSCR
1441 (2002) and preceding Council statements—the Council quickly passed
UNSCR 1483, unanimously recognizing the coalition as the appropriate “au-
thority” in Iraq pending establishment of a lawful government. The incongruity
of the refusal of the Security Council to support the coalition intervention when
it directly supported the repeated demands the Council previously made of Iraq,
and then to support unanimously a resolution recognizing the intervenors as
the legitimate “authority” in Iraq, is obvious.
An equally significant credibility gap exists between the noninterventionist
policy resulting from a divided Council and fulfillment of the humanitarian
principles of the UN Charter with respect to Iraq. The two main purposes of the
Charter as a whole are the maintenance of peace and security and the protection
of human rights.48 Article 2(4), the provision relevant to both these purposes,
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations” (emphasis supplied). The Iraq intervention clearly re-
flected the humanitarian purposes stated in myriad United Nations resolutions.
I would further argue that this intervention not only did not violate but actu-
ally supported the other requirements in Article 2(4), in that it did not signifi-
cantly affect, other than in a positive way, the “territorial integrity” or “political
independence” of the state against which it was directed. The territorial integrity
of Iraq remains undisturbed. Under the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein
there was no political independence, at least not for the people of Iraq. Nor did
political independence exist for the regime. Heavily sanctioned by the UN for re-
peated violations of international law, its economy was increasingly restricted,
and the only international intercourse available to the Baathist leaders was with
other rogue nations.
This argument is even more attractive legally when one studies the actual lan-
guage of the UN Charter. While the instrument is admittedly best known for the
articles that create a minimum world order system—as represented by Article
2(4) (prohibition on the use of force), Article 51 (exception for self-defense),
and Articles 39–51 of Chapter VII (addressing Security Council responsibili-
ties), there is certainly an equal emphasis on protection of human rights. The
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10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 3, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/6
preamble, in fact, focuses on the rights of individuals vice the rights of nations
when it states that the purpose of the Charter is
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which jus-
tice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom.
Article 1(3) reinforces this language by stating that a principal purpose of the
organization is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” Article 55
emphasizes the need to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.” The Economic and Social Council established in Article
61 provides the means by which the humanitarian objectives set forth in Article
55 are to be addressed and then reported to the Security Council for action.
International law requires that the community of nations first consider all
means short of force to address threats to international peace and security.
A NEW PARADIGM
The Iraqi intervention reflects an uneasy recognition that the Charter system is
inadequate to address certain of the security and humanitarian crises that may
come before the UN, if unanimity among the five permanent members of the
Security Council continues to be a requirement. Only the United States and
United Kingdom among the Permanent Five on the Security Council were will-
ing to support an enforcement resolution in the case of Iraq. Nevertheless, some
forty nations found that authorization of the Security Council was not neces-
sary in Iraq since the action was supportive of, rather than contrary to, the values
represented in Article 2(4).
The March 2003 intervention in Iraq thus obliges us to examine once again
the law relating to intervention in the case of violations of international peace
and security and of human rights. We must attempt to reconcile Charter values
on the one hand and required procedures on the other. Iraq is especially appro-
priate for consideration, since the widespread violations of its international ob-
ligations were condemned in unanimity by the Council in numerous UN
resolutions. Additionally, however, the human rights violations attributed to the
Baathist regime in Baghdad met all the requirements under pre-Charter law for
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humanitarian intervention. Specifically, the horrendous crimes against both
Kurds in the north and Sunnis in the south were widely recognized and little dis-
puted. The intervention had as its sole purpose to redress the threat to interna-
tional peace and security and to end the human rights abuses. There was no
intention other than that of restoring political independence to the Iraqi people
and the Iraqi nation. The territorial integrity of the nation remains intact.
Professor Louis Henkin suggests the likely result of such interventions, unless
the unanimity requirement can be separated from Security Council decisions,
will be the establishment of precedent whereby states or collectives, confident
that the Security Council will acquiesce in their decision to intervene, will shift
the burden of the veto. Instead of seeking authorization in advance by resolution
subject to veto, in this view, states or collectives will act and then challenge the
Council to terminate the action. A permanent member favoring the interven-
tion could frustrate the adoption of such a resolution.49
Henkin argues that this situation may already obtain. He suggests subsequent
Security Council ratification as occurred in Kosovo with UNSCR 1244, and by
extension in Iraq with UNSCR 1483, effectively ratified what earlier might have
constituted unilateral action questionable as a matter of law.50 The actions of the
Security Council in adopting UNSC Resolution 1483 and endorsing the author-
ity of the coalition during the transition to an independent Iraq clearly reflect
steps toward a change in the law. While it is unlikely there will be a formal change
in the Charter, the Council action supports an interpretation of law such that in-
tervention consistent with Charter values (i.e., when neither the territorial in-
tegrity nor the political independence of the target state is impacted in a way that
would other than support the values represented by Article 2[4]) will be en-
dorsed, not condemned. The international community must not be allowed to
excuse its failure to act with pre-Charter references to principles of
nonintervention and sovereign immunity and to the Charter requirement for
Security Council approval by the Permanent Five, when the lack of approval is
contrary to the values for which the Charter stands.
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